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Chapter 6 
The Duty to Provide Information to the 




According to Article 10 of Directive 95/46/EC, which applies `in cases of 
collection of data from the data subject'; 
Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must provide a 
data subject from whom data relating to himself are collected with at least the 
following information, except where he already has it: 
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
(b) the purpose of the processing for which the data are intended; 
(c) any further information such as: 
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, 
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the 
possible consequences of failure to reply, 
- the existence of the right of access and the right to rectify the data concerning 
him, 
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific 
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of 
the data subject. 
According to Article 11(1), 
Where the data have not been obtained from the data subject [my emphasis], Member 
States shall provide that the controller or his representative must at the time of 
undertaking the recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is 
envisaged, no later than the time when the data are first disclosed provide the data 
subject with at least the following information, except when he already has it: 
Professor of Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, University of Sheffield, Director of the 
Sheffield Institute of Biotechnological Law and Ethics (SIBLE), Co-ordinator of 
PRIVIREAL. 
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(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
(b) the purpose of the processing; 
(c) any further information such as 
- the categories of data concerned, 
- the recipients or categories of recipients, 
- the existence of the right of access and the right to rectify the data concerning 
him, 
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific 
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of 
the data subject. 
That the provision of `further information' referred to in Articles 10 and 11(1) 
(both specified and unspecified) is for the purpose of fair processing links these 
provisions to the principle of data protection laid down in Article 6(1)(a), 
according to which `Member States shall provide that personal data must 
be 
... processed 
fairly and lawfully'. ' 
This linkage is entirely appropriate, because the provision of information to 
the data subject prescribed by Articles 10 and 11(1) is of central importance to the 
objective of the Directive, which is to ensure an adequate level of protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms (in particular, the right to privacy) of natural 
persons with respect to the processing of personal data in all Member States. This 
is in order that Member States should have no legitimate excuse to restrict or 
prohibit the free flow of personal data between themselves on the grounds that 
other Member States do not provide adequate protection for fundamental rights and 
freedoms (see Article 1 and Recitals 1 to 10, especially Recitals 7 to 10). 
The right to privacy referred to here is, of course, that provided by Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a fundamental principle of 
EC law (see Recital 10). In line with this right, the Directive: 
prohibits the processing of sensitive personal data (Article 8(1)), unless certain 
conditions are satisfied (Articles 8(2)-(7)), which, in principle, reflect (inter 
alia) the need for a justification to be provided for a breach of privacy in the 
terms of Article 8(2) ECHR. 2 Although the explicit consent of the data subject 
is only one of the conditions provided by Article 8(2)-(7) of the Directive foi 
the lifting of the prohibition of Article 8(1) of the Directive, it seems to me 
that this implies (at least in the case of sensitive personal data) that explici 
consent must be obtained unless a justification for not doing so exists in thf 
terms of Article 8(2) ECHR; 3 
1 See also Recital 38, which states that the provision of all the Article 10 and 11(1 
information is necessary for processing to be fair. 
2 Because the Directive aims to protect fundamental rights and freedoms generally (se 
Article I(])), and not merely privacy, not only Article 8 ECHR is relevant. 
3 This is because the European Court of Human Rights has held in M. S v. Sweden [199"12 
EHRR 313, paragraphs 34-35 that to process/disclose sensitive personal data without tt 
subject's consent (even where the information is processed/disclosed to persons acting undo 
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2. provides the data subject with a right: 
- to find out from the data controller about whether or not personal data 
relating to him or her is being processed, for which purposes, and to 
whom it is being disclosed, and about the source of this data (see Article 
12(a)); 
- to be told of the logic behind any automatic processing of such data (see 
Article 12(a)); 
- to secure the rectification, erasure or blocking of processing that does not 
comply with the provisions of the Directive (see Article 12(b)); 
- to object on compelling legitimate grounds to the processing of personal 
data relating to the data subject (see Article 14(a)); 
- to object to the use of personal data relating to the data subject being used 
for purposes of direct marketing (see Article 14(b)); and 
- not to be subject to any decision that significantly affects the data subject 
that is based solely on automatic processing of personal data relating to 
the data subject (see Article 15(1)). 
Bearing in mind that Article 2(h) defines `consent' as `any freely given 
specific and informed indication' by which the data subject signifies agreement, 
possession of the information required to be provided by Articles 10 and 11(1) is 
clearly necessary for the data subject to give a valid consent. Equally, possession 
of this information is necessary for the data subject to be able to exercise the rights 
provided by Articles 12,14 and 15 of the Directive. Thus, to withhold Articles 10 
and 11(1) information from the data subject, is to interfere with the rights of the 
data subject provided by Articles 12,14 and 15 and with his or her right to privacy 
in so far as this requires the data subject to be granted the right to consent to the 
use of his or her personal data. 
In essence, logic and fairness both demand that if a right is granted to someone 
('Y') to something (`X') then Y must be granted a right to any necessary means to 
X as well. For this reason, a right to the provision of the information prescribed or 
indicated in Articles 10 and 11(1) is implied by Articles 7,8,12,14 and 15. While 
the Directive does not explicitly present the provision of the Article 10 and Article 
11(1) information as a right of the data subject, but as a duty of the data controller, 
because of the general correlativity of claim rights of a person with duties of 
others, to present this information provision as a duty of the controller is not 
incompatible with it being a right of the data subject. However, to present it as a 
duty of the data controller is appropriate, simply because whether or not the data 
subject will obtain any knowledge of relevant processing will be very much in the 
hands of others, especially, the data controller. 
a duty of confidence) is an interference with the right provided by Article 8(1) ECHR (even 
though the Court went on to say that in the circumstances of the case the interference was 
justified under Article 8(2) ECHR). Under Article 8(2) ECHR, a breach of Article 8(1) can 
only be justified if necessary and proportionate for the legitimate purposes laid down in 
Article 8(2) and in accordance with the law. 
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If proper implementation of Articles 10 and 11(1) is crucial to the achievement 
of the Directive's objectives, then in order to assess the adequacy of national 
provisions pursuant to the Directive, it is necessary: 
1. to determine what powers are granted to Member States to exempt data 
controllers from the duty to provide Articles 10 and 11(1) information to the 
data subject; and 
2. to assess the adequacy of safeguards put in place to accompany any 
exemptions from this duty. 
In this paper, I argue that (unless Article 13 of the Directive is appealed to), in 
order to implement Article 10, an unqualified duty must be placed on data 
controllers. Article 10 does not, however, explicitly differentiate cases where data 
are currently being obtained from the data subject and cases where data were 
previously obtained from the data subject and the data controller now wishes to 
make disclosures or process for purposes that were not envisaged at the time of 
obtaining. 4 Now, if Article 10 covers all cases where data are being, or were, 
collected from the data subject, this implies that it will be necessary for the data 
controller to go back to the data subject to provide the data subject with 
information if processing that was not anticipated at the time of collection is to be 
permitted (unless an exemption is provided via Article 13). On the other hand, if 
Article 10 only covers cases where data are being collected from the data subject, 
then unanticipated future processing by a data controller who obtains personal data 
from the data subject might seem not to be covered by the Directive (with the 
implication that Member States may regulate this as they wish). I suggest, 
however, that the possible `missing case' is covered by Recitals 39 and 40, which 
suggests a duty in relation to unanticipated processing where data were obtained 
from the data subject that is conditional in the same way as cases falling under 
Article 11(1) (where data were not obtained from the data subject by the date 
controller). Consequently, I argue while Member States may treat all cases when 
data are/were collected from the data subject under Article 10, the bes 
interpretation requires `the missing case' to be dealt with in terms of Recitals 31 
and 40. I argue, too, that if Article 13 is appealed to modify this picture thei 
reference to Article 13 (or the conditions it refers to) must be made explicitly i 
legislation, because Article 28(4) requires Member States to empower anyone t 
hear claims for checks on the lawfulness of processing that is pursuant to the use c 
Article 13 to restrict the provisions of Articles 10 and 11(1). 
As concerns the issue of adequate safeguards, I argue, principally, that 
national implementing measures are to meet the objectives of the Directive, the 
any processing under legitimate exemptions from the duties prescribed by Artich 
10 and 11(1) should be treated as processing likely to pose specific risks to t1 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject, and should, hence, t 
subjected to prior checking by the Supervisory Authority (or an independent Da 
While Article 11(1) does cover unanticipated disclosures, it only governs cases where d,, 
were not obtained from the data subject. 
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Protection Official acting under the guidance of the Supervisory Authority), in 
relation to which I make a few suggestions about the criteria that are relevant in 
such checks. 
Finally, to illustrate my analysis, I examine the UK's implementation of the 
duty to provide information to the data subject under Articles 10 and 11 of the 
Directive, and draw attention to what I consider to be its inadequacies. I also 
examine the effect of this in relation to Section 60 of the Health and Social Care 
Act 2001 and The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 
2002 made under Section 60, because these have features that are arguably 
unlawful in relation to Article 10 of the Directive, in particular, a fact which is 
obscured by the inadequacies of the UK's implementation. 
Powers to Exempt from Article 10 and Article 11(1) 
According to Article 11(2), 
Paragraph 1 shall not apply where, in particular for processing for statistical purposes 
or for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of such information 
proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or 
disclosure is expressly laid down by law. In these cases Member States shall provide 
appropriate safeguards. 
There is no parallel exemption provided from Article 10. However, Article 
13(1) provides that 
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations 
and rights provided for in Articles 6(1), 10,11(1), 12 and 21 when such a restriction 
constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard: 
(a) national security; 
(b) defence; 
(c) public security; 
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of 
breaches of ethics for regulated professions; 
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European 
Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; 
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with 
the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); 
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. 
This could possibly apply to medical research. For example, there might be 
cases where medical research to develop biological weapons or, more plausibly, to 
defend against them, could be necessary for (a)-(c). Provision (d) could be 
appealed to in relation to the investigation of fraud in medical research. Medical 
research is also, arguably, an important economic or financial interest of the 
Member States. In so far as (c)-(e) apply, (f) applies. And, at least in principle, 
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medical research could be argued to be something that individuals have a right to 
that can be placed in the balance with data protection rights of the data subject. 
This said, two things must be borne in mind. First, any restrictions must be 
necessary to safeguard the interests concerned, and this implies that they will 
generally have to be applied on a case by case basis, in consequence of which it is 
arguable that they may not be applied to medical research generically. Secondly, 
Article 28(4) specifies that 
Each supervisory authority shall, in particular, hear claims for checks on the lawfulness 
of data processing lodged by any person when the national provisions adopted pursuant 
to Article 13 of this Directive apply. The person shall at any rate be informed that a 
check has taken place. 
Matters are further complicated by the fact that what situations are covered by 
Articles 10 and 11(1), respectively, are open to interpretation. Does Article 10 
apply to all controllers who have collected personal data from the data subject? Or 
does Article 10 only apply to controllers at the point at which they are collecting 
data from the data subject? If the former, then Member States must (unless they 
restrict Article 10 via appeal to Article 13(1)) provide that a data controller who 
has collected personal data from the data subject for specified purposes Y without 
envisaging its use for purposes Z, but subsequently wishes to use the data for Z, 
must go back to the data subject to inform of this processing, and may not appeal 
to any disproportionate effort or impossibility in doing so to avoid having to do so, 
which might seem unreasonable. On the other hand, if the latter, then the case 
described does not seem to fall under the ambit of either Article 10 or Article 
11(1), because everything under Article 11(1) explicitly applies only where the 
controller did not obtain the data from the data subject. 
However, Recitals 38-40 might be of assistance here. Recital 38 states that, in 
order for processing to be fair, 
the data subject must be in a position to learn of the existence of a processing 
operation, and, where data are collected from him, must be given accurate and full 
information, bearing in mind the circumstances of the collection. 
Recital 39 then refers to two cases-processing of data that the controller did not 
collect from the data subject (which is covered by Article 11(1)), and disclosures 
that were `not anticipated at the time the data were collected from the data subject' 
(which is not covered explicitly by either Article 10 or Article 11(1)), and says of 
both cases that the `data subject should be informed when the data are recorded or 
at the latest when the data are first disclosed to a third party'. However, Recital 40 
then specifies that it is not necessary for `this obligation' to be imposed when 
conditions apply that are essentially those specified in Article 11(2). 
What does `this obligation' refer to? One possibility is that it refers to the 
cases covered by both Recital 38 and Recital 39. However, if this is so, then Article 
10 should have two parts. There should be an Article 10(1), which specifies the 
obligation, and an Article 10(2), which provides an exemption from Article 10(1) 
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with the same content as Article 11(2). That Article 10 does not have this structure 
is, I believe, conclusive that Recital 40 refers only to Recital 39 (and not to either 
Recital 38 or to Article 10). On this basis, Article 10 should be taken to apply only 
at the point at which data are being collected from the data subject, and the missing 
case of unanticipated disclosures where the data were collected from the data 
subject is to be dealt with on Article 11(2) lines by a direct appeal to Recitals 39 
and 40 as free-standing provisions. It is quite possible that Article 11(1) was meant 
to convey this; but its heading unambiguously limits the application of Article 
11(1) itself to cases where the information was not collected from the data subject. 
To this, it might be objected that Recitals do not in themselves have any 
legally binding force, 5 and that they can only have any force in relation to 
interpreting Articles in a Directive. Since there is no Article that explicitly covers 
unanticipated disclosures where data were collected from the data subject, Recitals 
39 and 40 cannot be appealed to in order to cover the case of unanticipated 
disclosures where data were collected from the data subject. 
However, in response to this, at least two things can be said. First, even if 
Recitals have no free-standing legally binding force, this does not prevent them 
from having a persuasive force, meaning by this that, provided that they do not 
contradict an Article, they may, at least, be appealed to in order to cover cases not 
covered by the Articles. Secondly, since the main purpose of Recitals is to provide 
reasons for the Articles, on condition, again, that the Recitals do not contradict the 
Articles, a teleological approach to the interpretation of a Directive surely permits 
free-standing use of Recitals to be made where the Articles do not cover important 
scenarios that are covered by the Recitals. 6 
However, whether or not we can make this response turns on how we choose 
to interpret Article 10. If we say that Article 10 covers all cases where data were 
collected from the data subject (thus including data controllers who wish to make 
disclosures that they did not anticipate or envisage at the time of collection), then 
Article 10 actually contradicts part of Recital 39 read with Recital 40, and we 
cannot make this response. On the other hand, if we say that Article 10 only 
applies at the point of data collection, then there is no contradiction when Recital 
39 is read with Recital 40, and we can make this response. 
I suggest that the latter is at least a possible reading on purely textual 
considerations. If so, then I suggest that the use of teleological principles that are 
well established in EC law? also suggests that it is the preferable reading. 
Consequently, I suggest that using Recital 39 read with Recital 40 to cover 
5 See Gunnar Nilsson, Per Olav Hagelgren, Solweig Arrborn, Agriculture (Case C-162/97), 
judgment of 19 November 1998, paragraph 54 of the judgment. However, it is arguable that 
this is restricted to cases where there is a conflict between a Recital and an Article of a 
Directive. 
6 For a detailed discussion of the ECJ's treatment of Recitals-see Deryck Beyleveld 'Why 
Recital 26 of Directive 98/44/EC Should be Implemented in National Law' (2000) 4 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 1-26. 
See L. N. Brown and T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (4th 
edn., London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1994). 316. 
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unanticipated disclosures where data were obtained from the data subject is at least 
permissible, and, indeed, the best reading of the Directive. 
Even this, however, does not cover the case of processing for unanticipated 
purposes when data were collected from the data subject. Nevertheless, if it is 
permissible to provide an Article 11(2) type exemption for unanticipated 
disclosures where data were collected from the data subject by appealing to Recital 
39 read with Recital 40, then it is surely also permissible to provide such an 
exemption for processing for unanticipated purposes when data were collected 
from the data subject. 
Finally, it should be noted that both Article 10 and Article 11(1) have an 
internal restriction to the effect that the additional information referred to in 
Articles 10(c) and 11(1)(c) need only be provided in so far as necessary to 
guarantee fair processing. This implies that there might be circumstances in which 
the provision of such additional information might not be necessary for fairness 
(and, hence, not obligatory). Consequently, it is open to Member States to make 
the provision of this additional information in Article 10 subject to proportionality, 
or practicability, or an equivalent condition. However, it must not be overlooked 
that this qualification applies only to the additional information of Articles 10(c) 
(and 11(1)(c)) and not to the information required to be provided by Articles 10(a) 
and 10(b) (and 11(1)(a) and 11(1)(b)). 
The Question of Adequate Safeguards 
If there is to be exemption from Article 11(1), then Article 11(2) specifies that 
Member States must provide appropriate safeguards. The Directive does not, 
however, specify explicitly or directly what the nature of appropriate safeguards 
might be. Does this mean that it is entirely at the discretion of the Member States 
to determine what constitutes appropriate safeguards; or can we infer at least some 
requirements from the Directive as a whole on the basis of which interpretations of 
individual Member States could, in principle, be held to be untenable? 
The objective of the Directive must constitute the focal point for any 
specification of appropriate or adequate safeguards. Since the objective of the 
Directive is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular privacy, 
appropriate safeguards must be appropriate measures to protect against breaches of 
these rights and freedoms. According to standard human rights thinking, in order 
for there to be a justification for interference with a right, the interference must be 
necessary for an overriding value, must not be more extensive than necessary, and 
must be sanctioned by law. In relation to this, appropriate safeguards must be 
appropriate measures designed to ensure that these conditions are satisfied. 
While the Directive does not specify such measures in relation to Article 
11(2), it is fairly expansive in relation to exemptions from the duty to notify the 
Supervisory Authority. When notification is required under Article 18, Article 
19(1) requires Member States to provide that the data controller must provide the 
Supervisory Authority with at least: 
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(a) the name and address of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
(b) the purpose or purposes of the processing; 
(c) a description of the category or categories of data subject and of the data or 
categories of data relating to them; 
(d) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data might be disclosed; 
(e) proposed transfers of data to third countries; 
(f) a general description allowing a preliminary assessment to be made of the 
appropriateness of the measures taken pursuant to Article 17 to ensure security of 
processing. 
This is not dissimilar to the information required to be given to the data 
subject under Articles 10 and 11(1). Consequently, measures that permit exemption 
from, or simplification of, notification are, arguably, highly relevant to measures 
that should accompany exemptions from any duty to inform the data subject. 
Unless processing is for the sole purpose of a public register (see Article 
18(3)) or for purposes of a political, philosophical, religious or trade union 
foundation (as specified in Article 8(2)(d)), Article 18(1) requires Member States 
to provide that wholly or partly automated processing be notified to the 
Supervisory Authority before it is carried out. Article 18(2) then provides that there 
may be exemption from, or simplification of, notification 
where, for categories of processing operations which are unlikely, taking account 
of the data to be processed, to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects, they [data controllers] specify the purposes of the processing, the data or 
categories of data undergoing processing, the category or categories of data 
subject, the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data are to be 
disclosed and the length of time the data are to be stored, and/or 
where the controller, in compliance with the national law which governs him, 
appoints a personal data protection official, responsible in particular: 
- for ensuring in an independent manner the internal application of the national 
provisions taken pursuant to this Directive, 
- for keeping the register of processing operations carried out by the controller, 
containing the items of information referred to in Article 21(2), 
thereby ensuring that the rights and freedoms of the data subjects are unlikely to 
be adversely affected by the processing operations. 
I suggest that these provisions should be treated as a model for appropriate 
safeguards under Article 11(2). Just as Article 18(2) envisages a Personal Data 
Protection Official standing in lieu of the Supervisory Authority to permit 
exemption from, or simplification of, notification, so the Supervisory Authority 
(directly) or a Personal Data Protection Official (indirectly) should be viewed as 
standing in lieu of the data subject whenever there is an exemption from the duty to 
inform the data subject under Article 11(2) (as well as in cases where data were 
collected from the data subject-to the extent that this is permissible). This is 
because not to inform the data subject seriously impairs the data subject's ability to 
exercise the specific rights (to access, objection, etc. ) granted by the Directive, 
which exists to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular privacy, 
in consequence of which, not to inform the data subject constitutes a specific risk 
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to these rights and freedoms by the very nature of the case. In effect, the 
notification provisions should apply whenever a Member State avails itself of 
Article 11(2). There is no difficulty with this; for, although notification is only 
required for wholly or partly automated processing, Article 18(5) provides that: 
Member States may stipulate that certain or all non-automatic processing operations 
involving personal data shall be notified, or provide for these processing operations to 
be subject to simplified notification. 
Alternatively, if notification is not to be required then, at the very least, Article 
21(3) should be invoked, which requires that Member States must provide that the 
Article 19(1) notification information (apart from security information of Article 
19(1)(f)) must be given to anyone on request for any data not subject to 
notification). 8 
This suggests a link to the Directive's provision on prior checking. Article 20 
requires Members States to ensure that the Supervisory Authority (or an 
independent Personal Data Protection Official acting in consultation with the 
Supervisory Authority) conducts a prior check in relation to processing that 
represents specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. While it is up 
to Member States to determine what processing poses these risks, any exemption 
from the duty to provide information to the data subject surely poses such a risk. 
Indeed, as I have already suggested, at least in relation to sensitive data, because 
lack of this information precludes consent, it arguably automatically involves an 
interference with the right provided by Article 8(1) ECHR, which requires a 
justification in terms of Article 8(2) ECHR. While disproportionate effort, as 
referred to in Article 11(2), is relevant to any such justification, it is surely not 
appropriate for the data controller to make judgements about this in what is the 
data controller's own cause. Furthermore, I do not consider it adequate to leave it 
to the Courts to decide the matter when the data subject makes a complaint. Unless 
there is prior checking, it is possible, indeed likely, that the data subject will not 
find out. And, even if the data subject finds out, at least in the case of patients and 
medical research subjects, he or she is in an inherently vulnerable position in 
relation to those against whom he or she wishes to complain (as well as generally 
lacking adequate resources to pursue legal actions). 
While the judgements made in prior checks need to be made on a case by case 
basis, it is possible to suggest a number of things about such checks. 
First, it is arguable that it is too onerous to require all exemptions from the 
duty to provide information to the data subject to be subjected to prior checks. 
However, even if this is so, it does not follow that prior checks should never be 
required when this exemption applies, and I suggest that they should at least be 
carried out where the processing touches on matters of religious, moral or general 
public sensitivity, simply because these are the cases in which persons are likely to 
have strong and predictable objections. 
8 It should be noted, however, that this is subject to restriction via Article 13, which the 
requirement to notify the Supervisory Authority is not. 
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Secondly, specific attention must be given to the security arrangements of 
Article 17 (which are not subject to exemption) when deciding on a justification 
for exemption from the provision of information. 
Thirdly, if processing does not need to be carried out in personal form then 
any personal data that is to be processed without informing the data subject should 
be rendered anonymous or at least securely coded. While this, in my opinion, does 
not preclude a breach of privacy when the data are used for purposes to which the 
data subject would object, 9 it is nonetheless necessary to limit the breach if it is 
otherwise held to be justified. 
As regards Article 13, Article 28(4) (which requires Member States to provide 
for the Supervisory Authority to hear claims for checks on the lawfulness of 
processing whenever exemptions created with reference to Article 13 are applied) 
provides a safeguard (though not, in my opinion, one that is as adequate as 
obligatory prior checking would provide). Apart from this, however, the Article 
28(4) provision suggests that Article 13 (or the grounds it provides) must be 
explicitly referred to when Article 13 is used to restrict the application of Articles 
10 and 11(1) (or the other Articles it may be used to restrict). This surely suggests 
that Article 13 should not be something that a Member State can claim in 
justification when its provisions on Articles 10 and 11(1) are challenged, if this 
basis has not been claimed in the implementing law. For, unless this basis is 
claimed it will not be possible for persons to identify what processing they may 
refer to the Supervisory Authority's attention in relation to Article 28(4). 1° 
9 See Deryck Beyleveld and David Townend `When is Personal Data Rendered 
Anonymous? Interpreting Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC' (2004) 6 Medical Law 
International 2: 73-86. 
10 It should be noted that exempting from the duty to provide information generally will, in 
effect, remove the right to object under Articles 14(a) and 14(b). Since neither Article 13 nor 
Article 11(2) provides any derogation from Article 14(b), it is probably better for 
implementing laws to treat the information provision required by the latter separately from 
that required under Articles 10 and 11(1). 
In addition, it should be noted that Article 14(a) specifies that the conditions under 
Article 7(e) and (f) for removing the prohibition on processing of personal data (processing 
in the public interest and processing for legitimate purposes of the data controller) may not 
be deployed without granting the data subject the right to object on compelling legitimate 
grounds relating to his/her particular situation unless national legislation removes this right. 
This appears to have the consequence that, whenever there is exemption from Articles 10 or 
11(1), the conditions referred to in Articles 7(e) or (f) may not be appealed to in order to 
legitimate processing, unless the right to object of Article 14(a) is removed for these cases 
under national legislation. I suggest, further, on the basis of requirements of transparency, 
that such implementing law under Article 14(a) may not be taken to be implicit in any 
domestic provisions implementing Article 11(2). 
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The UK's Implementation of Articles 10 and 11 
If the above analysis is correct, then there are essentially three legitimate strategies 
that Member States can adopt when implementing Articles 10 and 11. 
a. They may implement Articles 10 and 11 without any exemptions based on 
Article 13, or by reference to Recitals 39 and 40. If so, they will require 
Article 10 information to be given to the data subject whenever a data 
controller who obtained personal data from the data subject intends to process 
the data for unanticipated purposes, or to make unanticipated disclosures. 
b. They may appeal to Recitals 39 and 40 to create an exemption along the lines 
of Article 11(2), thereby not requiring a data controller, who obtained personal 
data from the data subject to provide Article 10 information to the data subject 
in relation to processing for unanticipated purposes, or the making of 
unanticipated disclosures if the provision of information would be impossible, 
involve disproportionate effort, etc. 
c. They may create exemptions from the provision of information to the data 
subject on the grounds provided by Article 13 (whether or not they have 
appealed to Recitals 39 and 40 to cover the `missing case' of processing for 
unanticipated purposes or the making of unanticipated disclosures where the 
data controller has obtained the personal data from the data subject). 
Which of these basic strategies has been adopted by the Member States (and 
those of the New Member States or NAS that have passed legislation with 
reference to the Directive) (as well as any other approaches) is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Here, I will pay detailed attention only to the UK's implementation, the 
main purpose of which is to illustrate my general analysis of Articles 10 and 11(1). 
The UK's Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) implements Articles 10 and 11 in 
Schedule 1 paragraphs 2 and 3. There are at least three features of this 
implementation that merit comment. 
First, where data are obtained from the data subject (the Article 10 case), the 
data controller has a duty to ensure `so far as practicable that the data subject has, 
is provided with, or has made readily available to him, the information' (Schedule 
1 Part II Paragraph 2(1)(a)). Article 10 does not, however, make this duty subject 
to practicability, quite probably because it does not recognize the possibility of 
impracticability in this case. Of course, Article 10 does specify that `further 
information' need only be given in so far as this is, taking the specific 
circumstances into account, necessary for fairness. If `practicability' refers to this 
then it is legitimate. However, it must be noted that (in Article 10) this 
qualification does not apply to the basic information concerning the identity of the 
controller and the purposes of the processing that are intended, but only to `further 
information'. Alternatively, the introduction of a condition of practicability might 
be interpreted as meaning that information about purposes of processing and 
disclosures need only be given in so far as these are envisaged or reasonably 
anticipated. If so, then according to my reading of Recitals 39 and 40, this would 
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be legitimate. It is also legitimate if `practicability' is intended to qualify the 
amount and detail of information (about purposes of processing, in particular) that 
must be provided, rather than as a condition qualifying the duty to provide 
information at all. However, as the relevant paragraph is worded, it gives no 
direction about what interpretations are intended" (and, see below, it is arguable 
that an illegitimate interpretation is required to square some provisions of The 
Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 with the 
Directive). 
Secondly, the information that must be given is less specific than indicated in 
the Directive, being information about 
(a) the identity of the data controller, 
(b) if he has nominated a representative for the purposes of this Act, the identity of 
that representative, 
(c) the purpose or purposes for which the data are intended to be processed, and 
(d) any further information which is necessary, having regard to the specific 
circumstances in which the data are or are to be processed, to enable processing in 
respect of the data subject to be fair. (Schedule I Part II Paragraph 2(3)) 
While there is nothing improper about this, it is less than helpful not to have 
included the examples of such further information that the Directive provides. 
Thirdly, whereas (where the data were not obtained from the data subject) 
Article 11(2) of the Directive does not require the information to be provided if this 
proves impossible, Schedule 1 Part II Paragraph 2(1)(b) states (as Paragraph 
2(1)(a) states for the Article 10 case) that the information need only be provided so 
far as is practicable. Of course, `impracticable' could be interpreted to mean 
`impossible'. It is, however, capable of being given weaker interpretations and 
quite probably will be. 
Part IV of the DPA (Sections 27 to 39) provides general exemptions, some of 
which are exemptions or powers to exempt from the duty to provide information to 
the data subject. 12 Many of these exemptions are clearly made, at least implicitly, 
by reference either to Article 3(2) (which places processing for purely domestic 
11 Although the Information Commissioner does not consider this matter explicitly in Data 
Protection Act 1998: Legal Guidance (Version 1, Wilmslow: Information Commissioner, 
1998), paragraph 3.1.7.3,33, the guidance focuses on the quality of the information 
provided and suggests that the only exemptions from the duty to provide information to the 
data subject are provided under Part IV of the Act (see below). 
12 Many of the sections give the Secretary of State the power to make regulations. This 
power has been used in several cases. 
In Part IV, the duties implementing Articles 10 and 11 are not identified separately but 
as part of what is termed `the subject information provisions' (which also include the subject 
access provisions of Section 7 that implement part of Article 12), or `the non-disclosure 
f provisions', which also include the 2°d, 3w, 4`h and 5th data protection principles (cf. Articles 
6(1)(b)-(e)), the right to object of Section 10 (cf. Article 14(a)) and the right to rectification, 
blocking and erasure of Section 14(1)-(c) (cf. part of Article 12) to the extent that these are 
incompatible with the disclosure in question. 
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purposes as well as activities beyond the scope of EC law outside of the scope of 
the Directive) (see Section 36), Article 9 (which permits processing that is solely 
for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes to be exempted from the data protection 
principles, though only to the extent that this is necessary to reconcile the right to 
privacy with the right to freedom of expression) (see Section 32), 13 or Article 13 
(which, to an extent, overlaps with Article 3(2)). In relation to Article 13, there are 
exemptions from the duty to provide information in relation to national security 
(Section 28), the prevention and detection of crime (Section 29), and various 
regulatory activities (Section 31). Section 38 empowers the Secretary of State to 
pass regulations exempting from the duty to provide information in the interests of 
the data subject, or for protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The basis 
for some of the other exemptions is less clear: e. g., the powers under Section 30 (to 
exempt from the subject information provisions in relation to health, education and 
social work data), Section 34 (in relation to information made public by or under 
an enactment) and Section 35 (when disclosure is required by law or in connection 
with legal proceedings). Evaluation of the situation is not helped by the fact that, in 
Part IV, the provisions implementing Articles 10 and 11 are not identified 
separately (see footnote 12). This is unfortunate, because some of the exemptions, 
e. g. that under Section 30, are easier to relate to these conjoined provisions than to 
those implementing Articles 10 and 11 (and I do not find it surprising that the 
Regulations that have been made to date under Section 30 concern only Section 7 
of the DPA (which concerns subject access) (see Statutory Instruments 413-416, 
2000). 
Despite what has been said in relation to the DPA's implementation of 
Articles 10 and 11, it is arguable that the departures from Articles 10 and 11 that 
the implementation appears to involve are to be justified as use of a Member 
State's discretion under Article 13. However, no provision is made in the DPA for 
the Supervisory Authority to hear claims for checks on the lawfulness of provisions 
pursuant to Article 13 by anyone (as required by Article 28(4)). This is significant 
enough in relation to the general exemption powers of Part IV of the DPA. 
However, it might, not unreasonably, be thought that such provision need only be 
made when these powers are exercised in regulations passed under the relevant 
Sections. But, at the same time, such a thought reinforces the perception that the 
provisions of Schedule 1 Part II paragraphs 2 and 3 (which, as they stand, make no 
reference to Article 13, or any of the justifications for restriction of the Directive 
provisions that it provides) cannot legitimately rely on Article 13, unless, and until 
sector-specific regulations are passed under Part IV. 
Finally, as regards appropriate safeguards, while the UK does make provision 
for prior checks of processing likely to present specific risks to fundamental rights 
and freedoms, it has done so only on condition that the Secretary of State passes 
regulations specifying `assessable processing' (see Section 22). However, no such 
regulations have yet been passed and there is no indication that processing that 
13 The exemption of Section 32 is, arguably, too wide in relation to the Directive. However 
since this exemption has little application in relation to medical research, I will not pursue 
the matter. 
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enjoys an exemption from the requirements of Articles 10 and 11(1) will be 
considered assessable processing. ' As safeguards, the Secretary of State has 
specified in the Data Protection (Conditions Under Paragraph 3 of Part II of 
Schedule 1) Order 2000 (Statutory Instrument No. 185) that, whenever there is 
exemption from the duty to provide information to the data subject, the data 
controller must give the information to anyone who requests it, and that data 
controllers must keep a record of reasons for considering that disproportionate 
effort would be involved in providing the data subject with the information. This 
approach is reactive rather than proactive and surely insufficient. 
While the Health and Social Care Act 2001 (HSCA) is independent of the 
DPA, Section 60 of the HSCA raises issues to which the UK's implementation of 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive are relevant. 
Section 60 of the HSCA gives the Secretary of State the power to pass 
regulations (which must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, the so-called 
`affirmative procedure') that render it lawful to process personal data without the 
subject's consent despite any obligation of confidence that is owed to the patient. 
The following conditions must be satisfied: 
a. The regulations must be in the interests of improving patient health care or in 
the public interest (s. 60(1)). 
b. It must not be reasonably practicable to obtain consent, because the 
regulations: 
may not make provision requiring the processing of confidential patient information for 
any purpose if it would be reasonably practicable to achieve that purpose otherwise 
than pursuant to such regulations, having regard to the cost of and the technology 
available for achieving that purpose (s. 60(3)). 
Section 60(2)(c) provides that: 
where prescribed patient information is processed by a person in accordance with the 
regulations, anything done by him/her in so processing the information shall be taken to 
be lawfully done despite any obligation of confidence owed by him in respect of it. 
Section 60(6) then goes on to say, 
Without prejudice to the operation of provisions made under subsection (4)(c), 15 
regulations under this Section may not make provision for, or in connection with the 
processing of prescribed patient information in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision made by, or under the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29). 
14 One might, perhaps more accurately, say that the DPA does not provide for prior checking 
but only provides for provision for prior checking to be made. 
is Quite clearly subsection (2)(c) is meant. What is subsection (2)(c) in the Act was 
subsection (4)(c) in earlier drafts. However two subsections (what were subsections I and 2) 
were dropped at the last moment; but hasty editing has not picked up on this. Similarly the 
Act at various places makes reference to subsection (3) when it means subsection (1). 
84 The Data Protection Directive and Medical Research Across Europe 
Section 60(2)(c) is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as stating that regulations 
passed under Section 60 render processing not unlawful on account of being a 
breach of confidence (but do not necessarily render processing lawful, as there 
might be reasons other than breach of confidence why processing might be 
unlawful). Alternatively, it can be interpreted as stating that regulations will render 
processing of confidential patient information lawful. 
The interpretation given is important, because, under the first reading, Section 
60(2)(c) says little more than that, once regulations are passed, processing of 
regulated data will not be a breach of the first data protection principle of the DPA 
(that data must be processed fairly and lawfully, etc. ) on account of being in 
breach of confidence, implying that processing that is contrary to the DPA for any 
other reason will still be unlawful. However, under the second reading, Section 
60(2)(c) appears to claim that processing of regulated data cannot be unlawful on 
account of breaching any provisions of the DPA. 
The second reading is surely not legitimate (though I expect that is the way 
medical researchers will be tempted to read it). Since the DPA is meant to 
implement the Data Protection Directive, a claim that the DPA cannot render 
processing that falls under the regulations unlawful is tantamount to the claim that 
the Directive cannot render them unlawful, and this is contrary to the doctrine of 
the supremacy of EC law. However, I imagine that it might be claimed that this is 
of theoretical significance only, on the grounds that the conditions that must be 
satisfied for regulations to be passed under Section 60 are sufficient to render 
processing lawful under the DPA (and, by implication, the Directive). 
Let us assess such a claim. To be lawful under the DPA (considering only its 
first data protection principle), processing of personal data on a person's health 
must satisfy at least one condition from Schedule 2 of the DPA (cf. Article 7 of the 
Directive), at least one condition from Schedule 3 (cf. Article 8 of the Directive), 
conditions of fair processing laid down in Schedule 1 Part II (which include the 
Act's implementation of Articles 10 and 11), and any other conditions of fair and 
lawful processing that are applicable under UK law (such as the common law on 
confidentiality). Because the DPA must, if possible, be interpreted in conformity 
with the rights of the ECHR recognized by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
(see Section 3 of the HRA), it is arguable (see above) that at least Schedule 3 
conditions other than consent may not be appealed to unless the obtaining of 
consent is impracticable. 16 Provision for this is, however, made by Section 60 of 
16 This is not the view taken by the UK's Information Commissioner in Data Protection Act 
1998: Legal Guidance (Version 1, Wilmslow: Information Commissioner, 1998) paragraph 
3.15,30, where it is stated that: 'All the conditions provide an equally valid basis for 
processing. Merely because consent is the first condition to appear in both Schedules 2 and 
3, does not mean that data controllers should consider consent first'. 
However, at least where the data controller is carrying out public functions (which 
doctors in the NHS do), the Commissioner appreciates that the HRA applies and that it 
would be unlawful to use private sensitive data without consent unless there is an overriding 
justification for doing so (see paragraph 3.14,30). This does not sit easily with the view 
given at 3.15. Perhaps, the Commissioner takes the view that the other conditions provide 
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the HSCA. Equally, Section 60 is in line with the requirements of justifying a 
breach of the right to privacy of Article 8(1) ECHR under Article 8(2) ECHR when 
it specifies that the regulations must be made in the interests of healthcare, or the 
public interest. Then, as far as fair processing is concerned, Section 60 arguably 
satisfies Schedule 1 Part II paragraph 2 of the DPA (cf. Articles 10 and 11(1) of the 
Directive), because this does not require information to be given to the data subject 
in so far as it is not practicable to do so (and it is arguable that if consent is not 
practicable then provision of information to the data subject is also not 
practicable). 
However, this latter point raises the question of the adequacy of the UK's 
implementation of Article 10 of the Directive, in particular; for (as I have already 
pointed out), Article 10 does not make provision of information to the data subject 
conditional on `practicability', and while Article 13 gives Member States the 
power to restrict Article 10 in such a way, the UK has not explicitly appealed to 
Article 13 for this purpose, and an explicit appeal seems to be necessary if Article 
28(4) is to be satisfied. 
Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that Article 14(a) specifically does not 
permit public interest aims to render processing legitimate unless the data subject is 
given the opportunity to object, unless this right is removed by legislation. The 
DPA has not done so explicitly. Indeed, in removing the right to object in relation 
to a number of other conditions of Article 7, but not in relation to the claim to the 
public interest (see Section 10 of the DPA), the UK would seem to have retained 
the right to object in relation to public interest justifications for processing without 
consent. 
Then, if Section 60 of the HSCA itself can be questioned, so too can The 
Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002,17 that has been 
passed with reference to the HSCA. While there are numerous difficulties with 
interpretation of these provisions, and the provisions are important for the second 
phase of the PRIVIREAL project in relation to the statutory role they create for 
research ethics committees, I shall not consider these here, as this would take us 
too far from issues specific to Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive. However, in 
relation to the latter, it should be noted that Regulation 2, inter alia, permits 
personal data on cancer patients to be recorded on cancer registries without the 
consent of the patients. By implication, this permits the data to be recorded without 
even informing the patients, because in order to satisfy Section 60 of the HSCA it 
must be reasonably impracticable to obtain consent for the regulation to be valid, 
and it is surely impracticable to obtain consent only if it is impracticable to inform 
the patient. However, the Regulations do not discriminate between the clear Article 
10 case where data are being obtained from the data subject, the less clear Article 
10 case (where data were obtained from the data subject but the controller now 
justifications in these terms. I disagree, because for an Article 8(2) ECHR justification to 
apply it must be necessary to interfere with the right provided by Article 8(1), and it will not 
be necessary if consent can be obtained (and will not in itself threaten more important 
rights). 
17 Statutory Instrument 2002, No. 1438. 
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wishes to use it for an unanticipated purpose, which I have argued is covered by 
Recitals 39 and 40) and those cases that fall under Article 11. Thus, the 
Regulations can only be acceptable under the HSCA (let alone the Directive) if it is 
true that it is impracticable to get patients' consent for their data to be entered on 
cancer registries when the doctor is in the process of getting this data from the 
patient. 
Related to this, it should be noted that Section 60 of the HSCA is supposed to 
be an interim measure until means of respecting confidentiality consistent with the 
public interest/interests of health care can be developed (which is reflected in 
Section 60(4), which provides that the Secretary of State must review the 
provisions annually). However, if it is considered impracticable to get consent 
from patients who are in front of the doctor, then it is exceedingly difficult to see 
what measures could possibly be produced to render regulations unnecessary. 
In order to put all of this in proper perspective, it is necessary to appreciate 
that Section 60 of the HSCA is the result of a concerted campaign by 
epidemiologists, who have pressed for all medical research to be exempted 
altogether from the DPA. '8 The thrust of the arguments presented, which focused 
on cancer research, was that it is impracticable to get consent from patients for the 
entry of their personal data on cancer registries and for the use of this in medical 
research and because the patients' clinicians would not always co-operate, 
resulting in less than 100 per cent of cases being entered on cancer registries, 
which would seriously compromise the value of the data. The fact that such 
arguments were accepted by Parliament, is, in my opinion, nothing short of 
scandalous. In approving Regulation 2 of The Control of Patient Information 
Regulations, Parliament either accepted the ridiculous view that doctor's reluctance 
to ask their patients for consent (or to give them the opportunity to object, which is 
more directly relevant to the issues raised by Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive) 
renders the getting of consent impracticable, or the view that it is in the public 
interest not to obtain consent (or to give the opportunity to object) because the fact 
that some patients might not consent (or might object) would seriously 
compromise the quality of data on cancer registries. However, in relation to the 
second possibility there is no reason to believe that more than a small percentage 
would refuse to give consent or object, there is no reason to assume that consent is 
related to the clinical condition in question, and a 100 per cent sample is, in any 
event, impossible as, for cancer generally, 100 per cent must mean 100 per cent of 
the human race. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have presented a very personal view, which many will no doubt find 
controversial. What centrally guides my analysis is the conviction that the 
18 See `Cancer experts call for action on GMC's confidentiality rules' (2 November 2000) 
Health Service Journal. 4. 
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Directive must be interpreted and applied by attention to its objectives, 
remembering that according to Article 249 EC (ex Article 189), Directives are 
binding on Member States in relation to the `result to be achieved'. Since, in this 
case, the result to be achieved includes the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms (albeit, because of the competence of the EC to legislate, only as means 
to the free-flow of personal data between the Member Sates) my analysis is guided 
by considerations of principle that are always implicated whenever attention to 
fundamental rights and freedoms is central. While others may have different views 
on what the implications of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms are, it is 
not debatable that such a focus must be central. It should also be obvious that the 
duty to provide information to the data subject of Articles 10 and 11(1) is vital if 
data subjects are to be able to exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Indeed, I do not believe it to be a distortion to say that these two Articles are the 
lynchpin of the whole Directive, in that any failure to implement these provisions 
adequately will fundamentally undermine the objectives of the Directive. Whether 
or not the partners in the PRIVIREAL Project are capable of reaching a consensus 
about the issues raised in this paper, the issues raised in it are, consequently of the 
first importance in relation to any assessment of whether the Member States have 
adequately implemented the Directive (and a fortiori, will be of equal importance 
later in the PRIVIREAL Project in relation to any recommendations that the 
Project will wish to make to the European Commission). 
